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YOU CAN BUILD A WALL OR DEPORT THEM, BUT YOU CAN’T TAKE 
AWAY THEIR GUNS: AN ANALYSIS OF WHY NON-U.S. CITIZENS ARE 
“THE PEOPLE” UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Andrew Figueroa∗ 
 
The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission 
for the first time to these shores.  But once an alien lawfully enters and 
resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution to all people within our borders.1 




The Constitution emphatically begins with a display of supremacy, 
“We the people.”2  The phrase “the people” appears in several constitutional 
clauses and most notably, appears in five amendments within the Bill of 
Rights.3  Who are “the people?”  Does the phrase “the people” refer to a 
specific class of individuals or does it refer to all people within the United 
States?  Does “the people” carry the same meaning throughout the 
Constitution or is the phrase defined differently in the context of the 
particular clause in which it is textually located?  The uncertainty of the 
definition of “the people” was revisited in a recent circuit split regarding the 
Second Amendment.4  The Second Amendment declares, “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”5  This amendment is 
arguably the most controversial and misunderstood provision of the Bill of 
Rights.6  With the more pressing questions of interpretations of the Second 
Amendment, the courts have not gotten around to extending consideration 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Florida International University College of Law, 2017; B.A., University of South 
Florida, 2011. A special thanks to the editors of the FIU LAW REVIEW for publishing my Comment. 
1  Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Douglas, J., for the court). 
2  Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1078 
(2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
3  Id. 
4  See generally United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015). 
5  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
6  Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV.  1, 1 
(1996); see also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640–41 
(1989) (writing that the Second Amendment is the most ignored patch of text in the Constitution, outside 
the Third Amendment, and is not at the forefront of scholarly discussion). 
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to what class of individuals is afforded the right to bear arms.7 
On August 20, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that illegal aliens8 and non-U.S. citizens are afforded 
the protections of the Second Amendment as they are considered part of 
“the people.”9  This decision created a circuit split as the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits held that illegal aliens are not part of “the people” and thus, 
not afforded the protections of the Second Amendment.10  Certainly, 
banning illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens from possessing firearms seems 
reasonable in the current context of the many tragic shootings and the 
related gun debate.  However, constitutional protections that are embedded 
in our history and traditions should be carefully analyzed before a blanket 
restriction is imposed on an entire class of individuals.  Specifically, there 
must be more to the discussion of their Second Amendment claims rather 
than imposing an all-inclusive ban that is grounded on unspecified fear and 
prejudice. 
Since the beginning of the United States, the interpretation of the 
Second Amendment has been highly controversial and deeply 
controverted.11  However, the debate continues and after a review of 
Supreme Court precedent and historical traditions, it is clear that the Second 
Amendment’s reference to “the people” reaches beyond citizens of the 
United States.  Although uncertainty remains, this Comment concludes that 
non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens, who have established substantial 
connections12 with the community and have accepted societal obligations, 
 
7  Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right 
to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1530–31 (2010). 
8  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012) (Federal law specifically 
categorizes aliens based on their registered status); see also BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 899 (2d ed. 1987) (writing that the term illegal alien is not an “opprobrious 
epithet” because it describes an individual who entered the country in violation of immigration laws). 
9  See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 672 (noting the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) was 
upheld because the statute passed intermediate scrutiny). 
10  See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Flores, 663 
F. 3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011); see also 
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (The Tenth Circuit declined to address 
the question, but held on other grounds that this class of individuals were prohibited from possessing 
firearms.). 
11  Allen Rostron, Symposium: A Loaded Debate: The Continuing Battle over the Second 
Amendment, 78 ALB. L. REV. 819, 828–30 (2015). 
12  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66, 271 (1990) (The Court made 
references to “sufficient connections,” “substantial connections,” and “previous significant voluntary 
connection[s],” however, this Comment will follow the language of the Seventh Circuit’s “substantial-
connections.”); see also Hon. Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 836 (2013) (noting that lower courts have used “sufficient, substantial, and 
significant connections interchangeably” and there is no indication that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court 
used these expressions to set out different standards). 
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are part of “the people” under the Second Amendment and thus, are 
afforded the right to keep and bear arms. 
This Comment has a narrow scope as it only addresses whether non-
U.S. citizens and illegal aliens are considered part of “the people” under the 
Second Amendment.13  This Comment will not analyze the constitutionality 
of statutes that regulate the right to possess firearms for non-U.S. citizens 
and illegal aliens or the constitutional scrutiny that ought to be applied to 
such regulations.  Also, this Comment will not attempt to address the 
current laws in relation to the existing gun debate.  Those issues are left to 
others. 
This Comment is broken down into four sections: (1) a brief discussion 
of the history of the Second Amendment, with an analysis of the scope of 
the District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago 
decisions and the influences of these holdings on the circuit split; (2) a 
review of Supreme Court precedent regarding the definition of “the people” 
within the Bills of Rights; (3) a summary of the decisions of the courts of 
appeals with an emphasis on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion; (4) and an 
analysis of why the Seventh Circuit is constitutionally correct and to be 




A. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
 
One of the most well-established and controversial American 
traditions is recognized in the Second Amendment, the individual right of 
“the people” to keep and bear arms.15  Much of the Second Amendment 
scholarship raises conflicting views of who is afforded the right to bear 
arms,16 and the amendment seems to have numerous faces, “each casting its 
gaze in a different direction.”17  The historical uncertainty continues 
because there is inconsistency among the courts of appeals as to who are the 
 
13  See Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix at 8, United States v. Meza-
Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271), 2015 WL 636261 (writing, “The Second 
Amendment encompasses undocumented aliens because they are, and always have been, part of ‘the 
people’”) [hereinafter Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix]. 
14  See Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1165–70 (Although upholding the gun restrictions on an 
illegal alien, the Tenth Circuit provided valuable insight on how to interpret the other circuit court of 
appeals and the Heller Court.). 
15  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
16  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1542–43. 
17  WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, SECOND AMENDMENT (UPDATE) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2347 (Kenneth L. Karst & Leonard W. Levy eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
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specific rightsholders entitled to this protection.18  However, no matter how 
controversial the meaning of the Second Amendment is today, it was clear 
enough to the drafters of the United States Constitution that the amendment 
guaranteed “the people” the right to possess their private arms.19  In fact, 
James Madison favored this interpretation and once assured the people that 
they shall not fear the new federal government because of “the advantage of 
being armed, which [they] possess over the people of almost every other 
nation.”20 
The right for people to bear arms is an American tradition with deep 
Anglo-Saxon roots.21  During the colonial period, American culture 
embraced the principle of private gun ownership.22  Much of this tradition 
was brought from English values, traditions, and legal concepts.23  In fact, 
as indicated by Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries, “[t]he subjects 
of England are entitled . . . to the right of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defense.”24  This right was integrated in America as it was 
the policy of most colonies to pass laws requiring all males to possess arms 
and to serve in the local militia.25  The term “militia,” as used in the colonial 
context, should take the meaning of all able-bodied men themselves.26  The 
coextensive use of the term “militia” and all able-bodied men is due to the 
necessity for each man to possess a firearm in order to report for duty and 
achieve the security of the free state.27  As tensions developed between the 
British Parliament and the colonies, the First Continental Congress 
condemned Parliament’s actions and called upon the colonists to arm 
themselves in defense against the British.28 
After declaring independence from Great Britain and during the 
American Revolution, Americans turned their focus to the task of drafting 
state constitutions and declarations of individual rights for the new state 
 
18  See Moore, supra note 12, at 801. 
19  DON B. KATES, SECOND AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2346 
(Kenneth L. Karst & Leonard W. Levy eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
20  Don B. Kates & Alice Marie Beard, Murder, Self-Defense, and the Right to Arms, 45 CONN L. 
REV. 1685, 1695 (2013) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, 269 (James Madison) (A.B.A. ed., 2009)). 
21  CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING (2d ed. 
2008) [hereinafter FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING]. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE 
FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769 (1979). 
25  FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21. 
26  Levinson, supra note 6, at 647. 
27  LAURIE DIMAURO, GUN CONTROL: RESTRICTING RIGHTS OR PROTECTING PEOPLE? 
INFORMATION PLUS REFERENCE SERIES 2 (2013 ed. 2013). 
28  FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21. 
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governments.29  Many of these state constitutions and declarations of rights 
explicitly ensured their people the right to keep and bear arms.30  Beginning 
in 1776, one month prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 
the state of Virginia pronounced in its state constitution, “A well regulated 
Militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, 
natural, and safe defence of a free State.”31  Additionally, Pennsylvania’s 
Constitution guaranteed, “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the 
defence of the State. . . .”32  Recognizing the importance of individuals 
bearing arms, other states followed Virginia and drafted similar clauses in 
their state constitutions.33  Specifically, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont guaranteed the right to bear arms in 
their Bill of Rights.34  However, state constitutions varied from declaring 
bearing arms as a “right” of “the people” versus calling it a “duty” of all 
able-bodied men to defend society.35  In fact, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont spoke of the right as a guarantee for 
“defense of themselves and the State.”36  The emphasis on these states 
adopting analogues, prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, provides a 
historical narrative that the Federal Second Amendment bestowed an 
individual right to keep and to bear arms.37 
The next step was the drafting of the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution, a document full of compromises and concessions.38  In 1787, 
thirty-nine delegates, from twelve of the thirteen states, gathered to sign the 
newly written Constitution.39 Initially, the politics of ratification was highly 
contested because a majority of Americans and states expressed opposition 
to the Constitution.40  In fact, three delegates were reluctant to sign without 
a Bill of Rights and in particular, protested that Congress “at their pleasure 
may arm or disarm all or any part of the freemen of the United States.”41  
 
29  Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 
260 (2000). 
30  FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21. 
31  Id.  
32  DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3. 
33  FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21. 
34  Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 810 (1998). 
35  FROM FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO FLAG BURNING, supra note 21. 
36  Volokh, supra note 34, at 812. 
37  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 601–03 (2008). 
38  MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN ACTION, THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
IN LAW AND HISTORY 48–71, at 51 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000). 
39  DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3. 
40  Michael Nelson, Constitutional Beginnings, in GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 45 (Michael 
Nelson ed., 4th ed.) [hereinafter Constitutional Beginnings]. 
41  DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3. 
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After Delaware became the first state to ratify the Constitution in December 
1878, Pennsylvania followed five days later, but expressed considerable 
doubts at the state’s ratifying convention because of the absence of a Bill of 
Rights.42  After similar complaints followed from other states, James 
Madison and the Federalists promised to consider amendments to the 
Constitution during the First Congress.43  Ultimately, in reliance on the 
promise, several states ratified and New Hampshire became the ninth state 
to ratify, which meant the United States Constitution was enacted.44  James 
Madison, in a remarkable political action at the time, kept his word and 
presented the drafted Bill of Rights to the First Congress.45 
James Madison’s drafting of the Second Amendment was particularly 
influenced by the ratifying state conventions that offered similar 
suggestions about the right to bear arms.46  Specifically, calling upon the 
states to ratify the Constitution, New York offered fifty amendments and 
included the following, “That the People have a right to keep and bear 
Arms; that a well regulated Militia, including the body of the People 
capable of bearing Arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free 
State.”  Additionally, Maryland and Virginia consolidated amendments and 
emphasized, “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms. . . .”47  
With these influences, the Second Amendment assimilated the following 
basic values: “[T]he right of the individual to possess arms, the fear of a 
professional army, the dependence on militias regulated by the individual 
states, and the control of the military by civilians.”48 
The inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights was a 
result of an ongoing debate over the relationship between military balance 
and the newly established system.49  With this debate over the power of 
militias and suggestions to reform the structure of the Constitution, several 
states proposed provisions to protect the necessary right to bear arms 
proscribed in the Second Amendment.50  Ultimately, the First Congress 
concluded the debate by declaring the vital importance of the individual-
right amendments and proposed the Second Amendment.51  The importance 
 
42  Constitutional Beginnings, supra note 40, at 45. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 46. 
45  BELLESILES, supra note 38, at 51. 
46  DIMAURO, supra note 27, at 3. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Thiago Luiz Blundi Sturzenegger, The Second Amendment’s Fixed Meaning and Multiple 
Purposes, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 337, 384 (2013). 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
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of the Second Amendment in American constitutionalism is irrefutable 
proof that the right to bear arms was “the true palladium of liberty.”52 
 
B. HELLER, MCDONALD, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
 
An extensive and growing debate has focused on the operative clause 
of the Second Amendment.  Scholars and courts have entirely overlooked 
thorny questions unanswered by the Supreme Court and the Constitution.53  
The unambiguous language of the operative clause of the Second 
Amendment, which states with unmistakable clarity, “the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”54 
The Second Amendment is a quintessential example of unsettled 
constitutional law.55  After nearly two centuries of being largely ignored by 
the Supreme Court of the United States,56 the Justices addressed the 
substantive meaning of the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.57  Although Heller factually dealt with the District of Columbia’s 
severe restrictions on the possession of handguns,58 the Court was called to 
interpret the meaning of the right to bear arms.59  This case originated when 
Heller challenged the District of Columbia’s statute that made it unlawful to 
carry unregistered handguns and required lawfully owned firearms to be 
kept at home unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger safety 
mechanism.60  The precise issue before the Court was whether to interpret 
the Second Amendment as affording a private citizen the individual right to 
possess a firearm or only affording individuals the right as a member of the 
militia or its equivalent.61  In a landmark 5–4 decision, the Court struck 
down the District of Columbia’s firearm ban and emphasized, “[t]here 
seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second 
 
52  Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and 
Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2006). 
53  Lund, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
54  Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 384. 
55  But see CARL T. BOGUS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF SECOND AMENDMENT 
SCHOLARSHIP: A PRIMER, THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 1 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 
2000). 
56  Lund, supra note 6, at 1. 
57  Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 
925 (2009). 
58  John Sousanis, Second Amendment, in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 55 (Donna 
Batten ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
59  Solum, supra note 57, at 925. 
60  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–76 (2008). 
61  Id. at 577. 
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Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”62 
The Court’s reasoning focused on a crucial distinction of the textual 
components of the amendment63 and noted that “[t]he Second Amendment 
is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative 
clause.”64  The emphasis of the operative clause is important because “[t]he 
first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a ‘right of the 
people.’”65  Emphasizing the importance of a historical interpretation of the 
text, Justice Scalia, for the court in Heller, indicated that the Court is guided 
by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary 
meaning as distinguished from their technical meaning.”66  Justice Scalia 
explained that the historical backdrop clearly substantiates the interpretation 
of the operative clause when defining the meaning of the Second 
Amendment.67  The Heller decision was a narrow one and did not undertake 
an “exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment.”68  Specifically, Justice Scalia recognized that earlier Supreme 
Court decisions failed to address the specific meaning of the Second 
Amendment and emphasized that the Heller ruling stands only to establish 
the amendment as a protection of an individual right. 
Coming less than two years after Heller,69 the Supreme Court revisited 
the Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago.70  In McDonald, 
five justices ruled the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as interpreted 
in Heller, is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and now extends 
 
62  Id. 
63  Kristen L. DeBoise, Constitutional Law––the Second Amendment––D.C. Statute Prohibiting 
the Possession of A Useable Handgun in the Home and Restricting Handgun Possession Is 
Unconstitutional, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 327 (2009). 
64  Heller, 554 U.S. at 575. 
65  Id. at 579; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (writing, “It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect”). 
66  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)); see also Solum, supra note 57, at 924 (writing, “the opinions in Heller 
represent the most important and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional 
interpretation among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court”). 
67  Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1545 (2009). 
68  JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2(b) (8th ed. 2010) 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). 
69  Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of 
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 (2009). 
70  Olesya A. Salnikova, “The People” of Heller and Their Politics: Whether Illegal Aliens 
Should Have the Right to Bear Arms After United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 625, 642–43 (2013); see generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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to state and local government actions.71  However, four justices ruled that 
the amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, while Justice Thomas believed that the Second Amendment 
should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.72  The plurality’s due process incorporation profoundly 
affects the ability to limit the right to bear arms to only citizens.73  
Specifically, the incorporative mythology is significant because the Due 
Process Clause speaks to “persons,”74 which is broader than the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause75 because it includes both citizens and non-citizens 
within the United States.76  In fact, the Due Process Clause’s “persons” is 
“presumably the broadest formulation of those to whom constitutional 
rights inure.”77  However, McDonald “is a fractured opinion”78 and the 
decision did not make a difference in the court of appeals’ analysis on alien 
gun rights.79  Neither Heller nor McDonald mentioned illegal aliens or non-
U.S. citizens, but the Heller decision ultimately had the more significant 
impact on how the court of appeals confronted the issue of alien gun 
rights.80 
 
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND “THE PEOPLE” OF THE FIRST, 
 SECOND, AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS 
 
Given the Heller and McDonald decisions, the Second Amendment’s 
operative clause still had one significant undefined phrase, “the people.”81  
The Court has only once previously attempted to scrutinize the phrase “the 
people” and considered it in the context of aliens (illegal or not) within the 
Fourth Amendment.82  In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court was 
confronted with this uncertain phrase and ultimately resisted to constrict 
“the people” to a citizen-only class.83 
 
71  2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 14.2(a) (2016). 
72  Id. 
73  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1539. 
74  Id. 
75  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”) (emphasis added). 
76  ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71, at § 14.2(a). 
77  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1540. 
78  Id. 
79  See Salnikova, supra note 70, at 656–57. 
80  Id. at 643. 
81  Moore, supra note 12, at 842. 
82  United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012). 
83  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1534. 
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Verdugo-Urquidez is a crucial decision as the Supreme Court’s 
holding affected the interpretation of the First and Fourth Amendments and 
subsequently, the Second Amendment.84  In this case, Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez, a Mexican citizen and resident, was suspected of being a leader 
of a violent and large organization that smuggled narcotics into the United 
States.85  As a result of the narcotics related activities, local Mexican police 
officers arrested Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to a 
California border patrol station.86  Following his arrest, DEA agents 
arranged for the searches of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s Mexican residences.87  
Subsequently, American and Mexican authorities searched the homes 
without a warrant and obtained incriminating evidence.88  Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the warrantless 
search was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.89 
The question before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to 
nonresident aliens.90  The Court started its analysis on the text of the Fourth 
Amendment and highlighted that the amendment “extends its reach only to 
‘the people.’”91  Despite arguments that the framers used the phrase “the 
people” to “simply . . . avoid [an] awkward rhetorical redundancy,”92 the 
Court correctly emphasized that “the people” is a term of art that is 
particularly employed in select parts of the Constitution.93  This deliberate 
use of “the people” contrasts with the phrases “persons” and “citizens” used 
in other clauses of the Constitution.94  Ultimately, the Court held, “[T]he 
text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and our cases discussing the 
application of the Constitution to aliens and extraterritorially require 
rejection of [Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s] claim.”95  However, the Court did 
 
84  The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1081. 
85  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990) 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. at 263. 
90  Id. at 261. 
91  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
92  Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU 
of San Diego and Imperial Counties, and Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of Respondent at 
12, n.4, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (No. 88-1353), 1989 WL 1127209. 
93  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–66. 
94  Id.; see Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1532–33 (writing, “The Constitution uses the words 
‘citizens,’ ‘persons,’ and ‘people,’ and does so, presumably, for distinct, although not precisely defined 
purposes”); see also Moore, supra note 12, at 807 (writing, “the Bill of Rights makes no mention of 
citizens; instead, it focuses on persons (and specific categories of persons) and the people”). 
95  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. 
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not make this determination solely based on the fact that Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez was a nonresident alien.96  Instead, the Court employed a 
sufficient connections97 test to make the determination that might place an 
illegal alien among “the people” of the United States.98  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the court, concluded: 
[The text of the Constitution] suggests that “the people” 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and 
Second Amendments . . . refers to a class of persons who 
are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be 
considered part of that community.99 
Although the Court did not reach a definitive holding as to who 
qualified as part of “the people,”100  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
clearly states that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have 
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country.”101  Thus, to determine if illegal aliens are 
entitled to constitutional protections, courts must analyze whether the 
individual voluntarily entered this country and has accepted some societal 
obligations.102 
In concurring and dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court Justices 
reiterated that illegal aliens should not be categorically barred from the 
protections of the Bill of Rights.103  Justice Stevens, writing a concurring 
opinion, recognized that aliens, who are lawfully present in the United 
States, are entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights because these 
individuals are among “the people.”104  Additionally, while dissenting with 
the Court’s decision, Justice Brennan wrote, “Fundamental fairness and the 
ideals underlying our Bill of Rights compel the conclusion that when we 
impose ‘societal obligations,’ . . . we in turn are obliged to respect certain 
 
96  Id. 
97  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (noting that the court used the 
term sufficient connections coextensively with substantial connections). 
98  Id. at 273. 
99  Id. at 265. 
100  Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 8. 
101  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
102  Id. at 260; see Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 
14–15 (citing to Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F. 3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the 
Verdugo-Urquidez test)); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (applying the Verdugo-Urquidez test)). 
103  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259–60. 
104  Id. at 279. 
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correlative rights.”105  Justice Brennan’s notion of mutuality is essential to 
his point and ultimately concluded, “When we tell the world that we expect 
all people . . . to abide by our laws, we cannot in the same breath tell the 
world that our law enforcement officers need not do the same . . . we cannot 
expect others to respect our laws until we respect our Constitution.”106  The 
touchstone of this case was not the question of whether the individual was a 
citizen, but the specific inquiry of the extent of one’s connections with the 
United States.107 
Although Verdugo-Urquidez interpreted “the people” within the 
Fourth Amendment, the case is important to understanding the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision and the opposing decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits.108  Specifically, emphasized by the Verdugo-Urquidez 
Court, the text of the Constitution suggests that the phrase “the people” 
used in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments should carry the same 
meaning because of the similarity of the worded amendments.109  The 
Supreme Court declared that it is widely understood that the First, Second 
and Fourth Amendments codify a pre-existing right of “the people.”110  
Ratified at the same time, each of these amendments contains the phrase 
“the people” within its text.111  Specifically, each of the amendments 
provides as follows: First Amendment: “[c]ongress shall make no law . . . 
abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances;”112 Second Amendment: “[t]he 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed;”113  Fourth 
Amendment: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated. . . .”114  Realizing the textual analysis of “the people” is the same 
 
105  Id. at 284. 
106  Id. at 297 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
107  The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1078. 
108  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. 
109  Matthew Blair, Constitutional Cheap Shots: Targeting Undocumented Residents with the 
Second Amendment, 9 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 159, 177 (2012). 
110  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (noting that the First, Second, and 
Fourth Amendments protects rights that predated the Bill of Rights). 
111  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States 
v. Emerson, 270 F. 3d 203, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting, “‘[T]he people’ have precisely the same 
meaning within the Second Amendment as without. And, as used throughout the Constitution.”); Florida 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 39 (2008) (emphasizing that “identical 
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). 
112  Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 9 (quoting the 
U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
113  Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. II). 
114  Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
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throughout each of the amendments, the Heller Court could not have 
possibly intended to reinterpret the meaning of “the people” and remove 
non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens from the protections of the Bill of 
Rights.115  This interpretation would result in far-reaching constitutional 
implications of already established constitutional rights that are afforded to 
this class of individuals. 
The Verdugo-Urquidez decision justifies why the Heller Court’s 
holding should only be regarded as deciding the individual right versus the 
collective right question.116  First, Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller 
decision, joined the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez and must have 
been clearly aware that the interpretation of “the people” had left open the 
possibility that the Second Amendment would extend beyond the 
citizenry.117  This justifies the main argument of this Comment, the Heller 
Court did not definitively attempt to clarify the rightsholders of the Second 
Amendment.  Second, Justice Scalia’s numerous references to citizens and 
law-abiding members in Heller must not be held to formulate a new 
interpretation of “the people.”118  In fact, this new formulation would 
explicitly contradict Verdugo-Urquidez, the same decision the Heller Court 
cites to in its decision.119  Specifically, in citing to Verdugo-Urquidez, the 
Heller Court adopted that “[‘the people’ is] a term of art employed in select 
parts of the Constitution . . . [and its uses] suggest that ‘the people’ 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second 
Amendments” refers to a class of persons who have developed sufficient 
connections with this country.120  Justice Scalia’s formulation of “the 
people” in Heller clearly contradicts Verdugo-Urquidez, but also 
purportedly affirms its definition and the sufficient connections test.121  
Ultimately, courts must recognize that the phrase “the people” is a concept 
explicitly found in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, with the 
framers deliberately employing the limiting terminology of “citizen” in 




115  Blair, supra note 109, at 176. 
116  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). 
121  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. 
122  Id. at 1536–37. 
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently found that non-U.S. citizens and 
illegal aliens are entitled to constitutional rights.123  Although the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision is contrary to four other circuits, the decision is 
constitutionally correct as non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens are part of 
“the people” under the Second Amendment.124  The decisions opposed to 
the Seventh Circuit are based on flawed reasoning.  Specifically, the courts 
misconstrued the meaning of “the people” by misinterpreting Supreme 
Court precedent, the Bill of Rights, and historical traditions. 
With a constitutional right at stake in their decisions, the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Eighth Circuits incorrectly interpreted that illegal aliens are not part of 
“the people” and thus, not afforded the protections of the Second 
Amendment.  Specifically, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits expanded 
the scope of Heller by focusing on Justice Scalia’s amorphous nouns and 
dicta used when discussing the people’s individual right to bear arms.125  
Justice Scalia makes references in Heller to “all members of the political 
community,” “all Americans,” “citizens,” “Americans,” and “law-abiding 
citizens;” however, the opinion is incorrectly interpreted to suggest that 
Justice Scalia was reformulating and defining “the people” protected by the 
Second Amendment.126  In fact, the Heller decision did not purport to 
define the term “the people;” instead, the Court focused on one specific 
question: whether the right to bear arms is an individual right to self-
defense or a collective right connected with the militia or its equivalent.127  
Specifically, Justice Scalia emphasized that Heller was the first “in-depth 
 
123  See Brief of Appellant at 6, United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-
1550), 2011 WL 2310104  (noting these precedent decisions and holdings, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
211–12 (1982) (the Equal Protection Clause extends to undocumented aliens) [hereinafter Brief of 
Appellant]; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (the Fifth Amendment “person” 
extends to resident aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (First Amendment extends 
protection to resident aliens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections extend to resident aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1896) (the 
Fourteenth Amendment “persons” extends to resident aliens)). 
124  See generally United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 664 (7th Cir. 2015). 
125  Heller, 554 U.S. at 645 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Heller Court overlooked the 
significance of how the Framers use “the phrase” in different contexts within constitutional provisions). 
126  See id. at 625 (Scalia, J., for the Court); see also Blair, supra note 109, at 168 (noting that 
Justice Scalia’s opinions “reveal a pattern of similar rhetoric, in which ‘citizen’ does not denote anything 
other than a simple inhabitant of the United States”). 
127  See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F. 3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
“Heller does not purport to define the full scope of the Second Amendment.”); The Meaning(s) of “The 
People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1087 (noting that the Heller Court expressly declined to 
address many Second Amendment uncertainties and the decision should not be identified as purporting 
to clarify the entire field). 
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examination of the Second Amendment” and therefore, “one should not 
expect it to clarify the entire field.”128 
At the heart of these Second Amendment cases129 is an issue that is 
broader than the mere possession of a firearm.130  The issue is whether 
illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens are afforded the right to bear arms and 
the right to defend themselves in their homes.131  Ultimately, Supreme 
Court precedent and historical traditions established that the Second 
Amendment is a pre-existing right that is extended to all people, including 
illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens, who have established substantial 
connections with the community and accepted some societal obligations.132 
 
A. UNITED STATES V. PORTILLO-MUNOZ - (5TH CIR. 2011) 
 
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to address the question of 
whether unauthorized aliens are considered part of “the people” under the 
Second Amendment.133  On July 10, 2010, Mr. Armando Portillo-Munoz, a 
Mexican native, who resided in the United States for one-year and six 
months, was arrested for possessing a .22 caliber handgun in Texas.134  On 
the day of the arrest, Mr. Portillo-Munoz was working on a dairy farm when 
police responded to a call regarding an individual “spinning around” on a 
motorcycle with a gun in their waistband.135  As police approached, Mr. 
Portillo-Munoz acknowledged using the firearm to protect the ranch’s 
chickens from coyotes and admitted to being illegally present in the United 
States.136  Subsequently, Mr. Portillo-Munoz was indicted and convicted of 
possessing a firearm.137  Prior to this indictment, there were no reports that 
Mr. Portillo-Munoz had a prior criminal history, arrests, or encounters with 
immigration officials and law enforcement.138 
Mr. Portillo-Munoz challenged his conviction by arguing that the 
statute violated the United States Constitution because he was afforded the 
 
128  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
129  Each of the defendants in these Second Amendment cases were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(5)(A), which made it unlawful for unauthorized aliens to possess firearms or ammunition. 
130  Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664 
(7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271), 2015 WL 3383302. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011). 
134  Id. at 438. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 438. 
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right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.139  Relying on the 
decision in Heller, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction by emphasizing 
that the “language in Heller invalidates Portillo’s attempt to extend the 
protections of the Second Amendment to illegal aliens.”140  The court 
focused its analysis on Justice Scalia’s numerous references in Heller of 
“law-abiding, responsible citizens” and “members of a political 
community” and concluded that “aliens who enter or remain in this country 
illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that word is 
commonly understood.”141  Despite the Heller Court specifically stating that 
its decision was not purporting to “clarify the entire field,”142 the Fifth 
Circuit held that Heller, in fact, did formulate the meaning of “the people” 
within the Second Amendment.143 
In contrast, Mr. Portillo-Munoz argued, relying on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez, that he had established sufficient 
connections with the United States to be considered part of “the people” 
under the Second Amendment.144  Addressing Mr. Portillo-Munoz’s 
argument, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent 
has emphasized that the same analysis should be applied and followed to 
define the meaning of “the people” in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment, to the Second Amendment.145  However, the Fifth Circuit, 
incorrectly and misguidedly, failed to analogize the Second and Fourth 
Amendment and concluded, “[W]e do not find that the use of ‘the people’ 
in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a holding that the 
two amendments cover exactly the same groups of people.”146  The court 
relied on the fact that the purposes of the Second and Fourth Amendment 
are different as the “Second Amendment grants an affirmative right to keep 
and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective right 
against abuses by the government.”147  Based on a broad reading of the 
Heller decision, as well as the perceived distinction of the Second and 
Fourth Amendments,148 the Fifth Circuit refused to apply Supreme Court 
precedent and held that “the phrase ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment 
 
139  Appellant’s Initial Brief at 10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 11-10086), 2011 WL 2115675. 
140  United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011). 
141  Id. 
142  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
143  Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 440. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) 
147  Id. at 441. 
148  Blair, supra note 109, at 175–76. 
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of the Constitution does not include aliens illegally in the United States.”149 
Disagreeing with the majority’s dismissal of Mr. Portillo-Munoz’s 
Second Amendment claim, Circuit Judge Dennis realized that the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision would have far-reaching constitutional consequences for 
illegal aliens.150  Specifically, the dissent emphasized that “[t]he majority’s 
reasoning renders [illegal aliens] vulnerable—to governmental intrusions on 
their homes and persons, as well as interference with their rights to 
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances—with no 
recourse.”151  One of the most powerful arguments for the dissent is the fact 
that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion is incongruous and wholly 
unsupported by the Supreme Court’s and Fifth Circuit’s precedent, which 
may lead to the elimination of already established constitutional protections 
afforded to illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens.152 
 
B. UNITED STATES V. FLORES - (8TH CIR. 2011) 
 
The next court to address this Second Amendment question was the 
Eighth Circuit.  On May 13, 2010, Joaquin Flores was arrested after an 
executed search warrant discovered a .22 caliber Intertech model, Tek 22.153  
Mr. Flores resided in the United States since his teenage years, was 
involved in a relationship with an American citizen, and had two U.S. 
citizen children.154  While Mr. Flores had been deported on numerous 
occasions, he maintained a home in Minnesota, held close ties with his 
immediate family in the United States, and earned gainful employment for 
the benefit of his family.155  The Eighth Circuit dismissed the case without 
independently addressing Mr. Flores’ Second Amendment claim.156  The 
 
149  Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 442. 
150  Id. at 448 (Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
151  Id. at 444–45. 
152  United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2011); see District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 
(1990)) (specifically explaining that “‘the people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select 
parts of the Constitution,” and that the phrase refers to those who are “protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments”); see also Emerson, 270 F. 3d at 227–28 
(writing, “There is no evidence in the text of the Second Amendment, or any other part of the 
Constitution, that the words ‘the people’ have a different connotation within the Second Amendment 
than when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a whole, 
strongly suggests that the words ‘the people’ have precisely the same meaning within the Second 
Amendment as without.”). 
153  Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 1. 
154  Id. at 8. 
155  Id. at 8–9. 
156  United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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court’s holding and reasoning cannot be discussed in detail as the court 
failed to address the merits of Mr. Flores’ Second Amendment claim.  
Specifically, in a per curiam decision, the court simply “[a]gree[d] with the 
Fifth Circuit that the protections of the Second Amendment do not extend 
to aliens illegally present in this country.”157  The merits of Mr. Flores’ 
claim warranted detailed consideration rather than a misguided reliance on 
unpersuasive authority and an erroneous, “agreeing with the Fifth 
Circuit.”158 
Mr. Flores’ argument relied heavily on the Verdugo-Urquidez 
substantial connection test and also presented a number of Supreme Court 
cases that established constitutional protections for illegal aliens.  Asking 
the court to recognize his right to possess firearms under the Second 
Amendment, Mr. Flores petitioned that “[the United States] is where the 
most important people in his life live, this is where he had a home, [and] 
this is where he had a job and employers and friends.”159  Further, Mr. 
Flores reiterated his connection with the United States by pleading about his 
involved relationship with a U.S. citizen and their two U.S. citizen 
children.160  With this substantial connection with the United States, Mr. 
Flores stressed the importance of the Eighth Circuit to follow the holding in 
Verdugo-Urquidez and find that “[h]e is a member of ‘the people’ as that 
term is used in the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”161  Instead of addressing Mr. Flores’ merits and his 
relationship with the country, the Eighth Circuit confined its analysis by 
relying on Portillo-Munoz and affirmed the decision on the grounds that the 
Second Amendment does not extend to illegal aliens present in the United 
States.162 
 
C. UNITED STATES V. HUITRON-GUIZAR - (10TH CIR. 2012) 
 
Nearly one-year after the Fifth and Eighth Circuit’s decisions, the 
Tenth Circuit was faced with the same vexing Second Amendment 
challenge.163  However, the Tenth Circuit sidestepped the constitutional 
question of the Second Amendment164 and reached the same conclusion by 
 
157  Id. 
158  United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). 
159  Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 9. 
160  Id. at 8. 
161  Id. at 9. 
162  United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011). 
163  United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012). 
164  Id. at 1169. 
07-ANDREW FIGUEROA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/17  1:46 PM 
2016] “The People” Under the Second Amendment 169 
 
undergoing an intermediate scrutiny analysis.165  In March 2011, officers 
executed a search warrant at Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s family’s home and 
recovered three firearms.166  Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s was a twenty-four year-
old Mexican citizen, who had resided in the United States for years.167  
Subsequently, Mr. Huitron-Guizar was indicted for being an illegal alien in 
possession of a firearm and entered a guilty plea.168  The long-lasting effect 
of this conviction was that Mr. Huitron-Guizar was to be transported to an 
immigration official for deportation.169 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction of Mr. Huitron-
Guizar by dancing around the Second Amendment challenge of the 
appellant.170  However, refraining from expanding the scope of Heller, the 
Tenth Circuit correctly emphasized that “aliens were not part of the 
calculus” of the Heller decision.171  Specifically, the court noted that neither 
the Heller majority nor dissenters mention the phrases “aliens,” 
“immigrants,” or “non-citizens.”172  The court further refused to read into 
Heller an all-encompassing interpretation of the Second Amendment 
because “[this] question seems large and complicated.”173 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision properly recognized that Heller did not 
purport to clearly define the full scope of the Second Amendment.174  
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s broad interpretation of Heller, the Tenth Circuit 
outright refuted the interpretation175 and hesitated to infer a rule from Heller 
that categorically prohibited non-citizens and illegal aliens from the right to 
bear arms.176  Specifically, the court noted that the use of the term “citizen” 
by the Heller majority was not deliberate because it would directly conflict 
with Verdugo-Urquidez, a case the Heller majority relied on.177  The court 
emphasized that relying on the use of “citizen” in Heller “would require 
[this court] to hold that the same ‘people’ who receive Fourth Amendment 
protections are denied Second Amendment protections, even though both 
rights seem at root concerned with guarding the sanctity of the home 
 
165  Blair, supra note 109, at 164. 
166  Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1165. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Rostron, supra note 11, at 827. 
171  United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012). 
172  Id. 
173  Id. at 1169. 
174  Id. at 1168. 
175  Blair, supra note 109, at 164. 
176  Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168. 
177  Id. 
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against invasion.”178 
Instead of reaching a conclusion on the Second Amendment challenge, 
the court upheld Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s conviction by applying intermediate 
scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) and concluded that “courts must defer 
to Congress as it lawfully exercises its constitutional power . . . to ensure 
safety and order.”179  Although the Tenth Circuit avoided the constitutional 
question of the Second Amendment, the court’s opinion provided valuable 
insight on how to interpret the amendment.180  Specifically, the court 
emphasized the need to follow a historical approach; however, in the 
present case, neither party addressed this textual-history inquiry of gun 
ownership and citizenship and thus, the court “abstain[ed] on [the] question 
[with] such far-reaching dimensions without [the] full record and 
adversarial argument.”181 
 
D. UNITED STATES V. CARPIO-LEON - (4TH CIR. 2012) 
 
The Fourth Circuit was the last circuit to wrongfully deny a class of 
individuals Second Amendment protections.  On February 24, 2011, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested Nicolas Carpio-Leon, a 
citizen of Mexico, for possessing a .22 caliber Marlin rifle, a 9 mm Hi–
Point model C pistol, and ammunition following a consensual search.182  Up 
until the date of the arrest, Mr. Carpio-Leon had lived in the United States 
for thirteen years with his three children, each of whom were born in the 
United States, and had no prior criminal record.183  Subsequently, Mr. 
Carpio-Leon moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.184  The district court denied his motion, 
finding that “[Heller] and other Supreme Court precedent foreclose[d] [his] 
argument that aliens illegally present in the United States are among those 
protected by the Second Amendment.”185 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Carpio-Leon’s Second 
Amendment challenge and held that the amendment does not afford 
protections to illegal aliens.186  Relying on the Heller decision and 
 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at 1170. 
180  Id. at 1169. 
181  Id. 
182  United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 975 (4th Cir. 2012). 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. at 976. 
186  Id. at 975. 
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undergoing a historical analysis, the court reasoned that “illegal aliens do 
not fall in the class of persons who are classified as law-abiding members of 
the political community for the purpose of defining the Second 
Amendment’s scope.”187  The court improperly relied on the term “law-
abiding, responsible citizens”188 because Justice Scalia’s amorphous 
references were not intended to redefine the scope of “the people” within 
the Second Amendment.  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit went on to 
question how an unauthorized alien is law-abiding by characterizing their 
particular relationship to the United States.189  Specifically, the court 
asserted, “[T]he crime of illegal entry inherently carries this additional 
aspect that leaves an illegal alien’s status substantially unprotected by the 
Constitution in many respects.”190  The distinct analysis of this court is 
incorrect as it completely misconstrued and broadened the holding of 
Heller. 
In contrast, Mr. Carpio-Leon disputed the government’s historical 
analysis of the Second Amendment and argued that the “Second 
Amendment could not have been intended to exclude illegal aliens from its 
scope.”191  Mr. Carpio-Leon reasoned that “‘[historical] attitudes toward 
immigration were the reverse of today’s attitudes’ and that ‘[c]onsidering 
the country’s need for immigrants to settle frontier areas[,] . . . denying 
immigrants the right to defend themselves and their families would have 
been unthinkable.’”192  Although the Fourth Circuit accurately noted that 
the Supreme Court was not clear on whether “the people” extended to 
illegal aliens, the court dismissed Mr. Carpio-Leon’s historical claim 
because it “does not controvert the historical evidence supporting the notion 
that the government could disarm individuals who are not law-abiding 
members of the political community.”193  The Fourth Circuit 
overemphasized the historical discussion in Heller and misguidedly stressed 
that the Second Amendment exclusively and unequivocally protects law-
abiding members of the political community.194  The court then recited, 
“most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms 
was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the 
 
187  Id. at 981; see also The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 
1099 (emphasizing “that courts should not adopt [a] strong reading of Heller”). 
188  United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012); 
189  Id. at 981. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 976. 
192  Id. at 980–81. 
193  Id. at 980. 
194  United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012). 
07-ANDREW FIGUEROA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/17  1:46 PM 
172 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:151 
 
government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”195 
Furthermore, the court relied heavily on the significance of the illegal 
status of Mr. Carpio-Leon.196  Specifically, the court emphasized Mr. 
Carpio-Leon’s particular relationship as an illegal alien with the United 
States197 and limited its analysis to a wrongful application of Heller.198  
Judge Niemeyer, writing for the court, stressed: 
[W]e need not limit our analysis to the scope of the term 
“the people” and thereby become enmeshed in the question 
of whether “the people” includes illegal aliens or whether 
the term has the same scope in each of its constitutional 
uses. This is because Heller concludes, through a distinct 
analysis, that the core right historically protected by the 
Second Amendment is the right of self-defense by “law-
abiding, responsible citizens” . . . [to which is a class that] 
illegal aliens do not belong.199 
 
E. UNITED STATES V. MEZA-RODRIGUEZ - (7TH CIR. 2015) 
 
The Seventh Circuit was the most recent Circuit Court of Appeals to 
be confronted with the question of defining “the people” within the Second 
Amendment.200  Mariano Meza-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, was brought 
to the United States when he was four or five years old and has remained in 
the country since that time.201  In August 2013, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s 
trouble began when a bar fight broke out and witnesses identified him as an 
individual carrying a firearm.202  Subsequently, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was 
arrested and convicted for carrying a .22 Caliber cartridge.203  Although Mr. 
Meza-Rodriguez was arrested for the possession of a firearm cartridge, the 
issue before the Seventh Circuit was what he did not possess—
documentation showing that he was lawfully in the United States.204  At the 
trial court, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the conviction and 
asserted that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on his Second 
 
195  Id. at 979–980 (quoting United States v. Vongxay, 594 F. 3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
196  Id. at 981. 
197  Id. 
198  Anjali Motgi, Of Arms and Aliens, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2 (2013). 
199  Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d at 978–79. 
200  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015). 
201  Id. 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. 
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Amendment right to bear arms.205 
Although upholding Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s conviction, the Seventh 
Circuit held that unauthorized non-citizens have the constitutional right to 
invoke the Second Amendment.206  The court properly recognized that the 
identical phrasing of “the people” throughout the Bill of Rights must carry 
the same meaning because the amendments were adopted as a package.207  
Reluctant to put more weight on the Heller decision, the court identified 
that neither Heller nor any other Supreme Court decision has addressed 
whether non-U.S. citizens or illegal aliens are part of “the people” under the 
Second Amendment.208  Specifically, the court noted that Heller’s rhetoric 
of referencing “law-abiding members” and “members of the political 
community” did not reflect the Court defining the meaning of “the 
people.”209  However, the Seventh Circuit relied on the opinion in Heller in 
certain regards when it noted the “similarities between the Second 
Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, [which] impl[ies] that 
the phrase ‘the people’ (which occurs in all three) has the same meaning in 
all three provisions.”210 
After recognizing that “the people” in the First, Second, and Fourth 
Amendments carried the same meaning throughout, the court turned its 
focus on defining the phrase “the people.”211 The Seventh Circuit employed 
the Verdugo-Urquidez’s substantial connection test.212  Relying on the 
recognition that “the people” should be defined consistently, the Seventh 
Circuit emphasized that the Second Amendment analysis must apply the 
same substantial connection analysis, as applied to the Fourth Amendment, 
to determine if unauthorized aliens and non-U.S. citizens are part of “the 
people.”213 
In contrast, the government’s argument countered the substantial 
connections test by focusing on Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s immigration status 
and “unsavory traits.”214  First, the government argued that unauthorized 
non-U.S. citizens cannot accept the basic obligations of society because 
these individuals are illegal under the law.215  Second, the government 
 
205  Id. 
206  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015). 
207  Id. at 670. 
208  Id. at 669. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. at 670. 
212  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015). 
213  Id. 
214  Id. at 671. 
215  Id. 
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questioned Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s moral character by introducing his 
multiple interactions with law enforcement to allude that Mr. Meza-
Rodriguez has not accepted the basic obligations of living in American 
society.216  Ultimately, the court rejected the government’s argument and 
emphasized that this factual inquiry of the individual would cause a case-
by-case analysis that would be difficult to implement.217  Specifically, the 
case-by-case analysis would subject non-citizens to the potential of losing 
previously held constitutional rights simply because the non-citizen or 
illegal immigrant began to behave in a criminal or immoral way.218  The 
court emphasized that the Second Amendment is “not limited to such on-
again, off-again protection.”219  Instead, the court declared that “the only 
question is whether the alien has developed substantial connections as a 
resident in this country.”220 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit then addressed the question of 
whether unauthorized aliens are to be considered part of “the people” for 
constitutional purposes.221  Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the 
Seventh Circuit noted that “Plyler shows that even unauthorized aliens 
enjoy certain constitutional rights, and so unauthorized status (reflected in 
the lack of documentation) cannot support a per se exclusion from ‘the 
people’ protected by the Bill of Rights.”222  In fact, Supreme Court 
precedent has long recognized that unauthorized aliens and non-citizens are 
protected under the Bill of Rights when they have developed substantial 
connections with this country.223 
Although Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s behavior was not commendable, the 
Seventh Circuit held that he was entitled to the protections of the Second 
Amendment.224  Chief Judge Wood, writing for the court, concluded: 
In the post-Heller world, where it is now clear that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms is no second-class 
entitlement, we see no principled way to carve out the 
 
216  Id. 
217  Id. 
218  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2015). 
219  Id. 
220  Id. 
221  Id. 
222  Id. at 672; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (writing, “Whatever his status under the 
immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens 
whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due 
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
223  Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 671 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259, 260 (1990)). 
224  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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Second Amendment and say that the unauthorized (or 
maybe all noncitizens) are excluded.  No language in the 
Amendment supports such a conclusion, nor, as we have 
said, does a broader consideration of the Bill of Rights.225 
Again, this case is bigger than the cartridge that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez 
possessed.226  This case is about the Seventh Circuit accurately interpreting 
Supreme Court precedent227 and holding that the Second Amendment 
protects unauthorized aliens and non-U.S. citizens.228  After the court held 
that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez could invoke the protections of the Second 
Amendment, the court then analyzed whether the statute was a permissible 
restriction on the right to bear arms.229 
 
IV. THE IMPACT AND ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
 DECISIONS 
 
With little guidance from the Supreme Court defining “the people” in 
the Second Amendment,230 this Comment supports the approach utilized by 
the Seventh Circuit in the Meza-Rodriguez decision.  There are countless 
individuals who work for their families, accept societal obligations, and 
maintain ties in the United States, but are not entitled to the constitutional 
protections of the Second Amendment because of their illegal status or not 
attaining U.S. citizenship.  Making a determination based on the reasoning 
that simply because individuals are not citizens, they are not part of “the 
people” is an unwarranted intrusion on constitutional rights with far-
reaching implications.  Specifically, the constitutional implications will 
render these individuals vulnerable to government violations of the Bill of 
Rights with no recourse.231  Dating back to this nation’s founding and 
continuing today, courts have struggled to clearly define the constitutional 
 
225  Id. 
226  Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 130, at 14. 
227  Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 664. 
228  Id. at 671; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in 
[the United States] is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to . . . protection” under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.). 
229  Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 672. 
230  United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasizing, “The 
only Supreme Court case to scrutinize the phrase [the people] is United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez”). 
231  See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that unauthorized aliens are 
not part of the people “renders them vulnerable—to governmental intrusions on their homes and 
persons, as well as interference with their rights to assemble and petition the government for redress of 
grievances—with no recourse”). 
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rights and protections associated with illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens.232  
Instead of foreclosing constitutional rights solely based on a status, courts 
must undergo an in-depth analysis of the specific text of the United States 
Constitution and the precedents set forth by the Supreme Court. 
The Second Amendment has been the source of a never-ending debate 
that has added uncertainty and tension to the amendment’s interpretation 
and meaning.233  The right to bear arms is not an unlimited right234 and 
courts are reluctant to grant this right to non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens 
because of unspecified fear and prejudice.  In fact, the contrary circuits have 
held that individuals, who have lived here peacefully, though 
undocumented and illegal, are constitutionally prohibited from the 
protections of the right to keep and bear arms.235  The right to protect 
oneself and home is a fundamental right deeply rooted in historical 
traditions and courts are subjecting non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens to 
the vulnerabilities of non-protection.  The opposing circuits’ reluctance to 
recognize these individuals’ constitutional right is unsound and unsupported 
because each circuit relies on overly broad interpretations of dicta in Heller 
and refuses to recognize that Verdugo-Urquidez is still controlling 
precedent.  Specifically, the reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth 
Circuits is flawed because each court relies on a proposition that the Heller 
Court did not definitively attempt to clarify or define.  Certain policy 
decisions may warrant prohibitions against these individuals to possess 
firearms, but these policy choices must not supplant the constitutional right 
of these individuals to keep and bear arms. 
The Fifth Circuit was the first court to wrongly decide that illegal 
aliens are not considered part of “the people” under the Second 
Amendment.236  This decision was flawed because it focused on an 
expanded interpretation of the Heller decision.  Specifically, the Fifth 
Circuit incorrectly concentrated on Justice Scalia’s numerous references of 
the different classes of individuals to imply that Heller narrowed the 
definition of “the people.”  In fact, it is well noted that Heller was primarily 
concerned with the question of deciding whether the Second Amendment is 
an individual right or a collective right, not the precise identity of “the 
 
232  Moore, supra note 12, at 803; see also The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 
supra note 2, at 1099 (concluding, “it may be possible to view Heller as a commentary on the meaning 
of ‘the people’ in the First and Fourth Amendments, this interpretation is at odds with the Court’s 
precedents, the Constitution’s purposes, and this country’s principles”). 
233  Salnikova, supra note 70, at 637. 
234  See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008). 
235  Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 29. 
236  See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d at 439. 
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people.”237  Based on this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion 
overreaches because it is not supported or founded in the holding of 
Heller.238  The Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s amorphous nouns 
affords too much weight to these inadvertent references239 and thus, leads to 
a misguided interpretation of the meaning of “the people” in the Second 
Amendment.  This unsupported position taken by the Fifth Circuit is 
misguided because it leads to a narrow interpretation that the Second 
Amendment proffers a citizen only right.240  Implying that “the people” 
equates to “citizen” within the Second Amendment ultimately implies that 
the Bill of Rights is a citizen only entitlement, which is contrary to already 
established Supreme Court precedent. 
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation is misguided because 
the Supreme Court has widely recognized the different terms of art 
employed in the Constitution.  Indeed, if the drafters intended to proffer the 
Bill of Rights as a citizen only right, then why not specifically use “citizen,” 
which is explicitly employed in other distinct parts of the United States 
Constitution?  What was most surprising of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of 
Heller was its acknowledgment that the Heller decision did not purport “to 
clarify the entire field” of the Second Amendment,241 but then expanded the 
reading of Justice Scalia’s noun usage to define and clarify unresolved 
issues.  This analysis and proposition is counterintuitive and ultimately 
leads to an overreaching holding with neither supporting precedent nor 
historical foundation. 
Another flaw of the Fifth Circuit’s decision was its analysis of 
distinguishing the Second and Fourth Amendment by emphasizing that the 
interpretation of “the people” within each amendment should not be 
identical.242  The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that 
the meaning of “the people” in the Fourth Amendment should be 
interpreted in the same context as the Second Amendment; however, the 
Fifth Circuit deviated from this precedent and created an alternative 
analysis by focusing between the difference of a protected right (Fourth 
Amendment) and an affirmative right (Second Amendment).243  This is the 
most contradictory part of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis as the same decision 
 
237  The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1085. 
238  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008). 
239  Id. 
240  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1571. 
241  See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011). 
242  See id. at 441. 
243  See Blair, supra note 109, at 185 (writing that this affirmative versus passive right test finds 
little support in precedent and is unlikely to be followed by other courts addressing this rule). 
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it has relied on throughout its opinion, Heller, quotes Verdugo-Urquidez’s 
unambiguous language that “the people” protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, are also protected by the First and Second Amendment.244  
This selective choice of dicta and precedent leads to a flawed analysis and 
decision.  Specifically, it is clear that the Heller Court’s citing to Verdugo-
Urquidez strongly indicates that the Court supports and adopts this 
interpretation of “the people.”245  However, the Fifth Circuit failed to 
recognize this aspect of Heller and ultimately, deprived illegal aliens and 
non-U.S. citizens of the protections of the Second Amendment. 
The Fifth Circuit was a divided court and the dissent clearly rejected 
the majority’s dismissal of the Second Amendment claim.246 The dissent 
supported the viewpoint of this Comment, that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of “the people” in Verdugo-Urquidez is the correct analysis to 
be applied to the Second Amendment.247  Although the Supreme Court has 
not resolved this prevailing issue, the Fifth Circuit’s decision overreached 
and misguidedly expanded the Heller decision through its refusal to 
recognize the clear criteria settled in Verdugo-Urquidez—still controlling 
precedent.248  The court’s failure to recognize the Verdugo-Urquidez 
interpretation of “the people” creates a lingering threat to other 
constitutional rights proffered to this class of individuals.249  This picking 
and choosing of rights afforded to citizens is based on arbitrary analysis that 
will ultimately strip away protections already afforded to non-U.S. Citizens 
and illegal aliens.250  In fact, the Fifth Circuit’s lack of textual support,251 
other than inadvertent nouns used by Justice Scalia in Heller,252 supports 
the conclusion that the Second Amendment protections extend beyond the 
citizenry. 
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit to address the interpretation of 
“the people” and did little to clarify the analysis and interpretation set forth 
 
244  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
245  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1536. 
246  United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
247  Id. 
248  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1990). 
249 Constitutional Law––Second Amendment––Fifth Circuit Holds That Undocumented 
Immigrants Do Not Have Second Amendment Rights.––United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F. 3d 437 
(5th Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836 (2012) (writing, “it was unfortunate because the [Portillo-
Munoz] [C]ourt implied that undocumented immigrants may not have Fourth Amendment rights when, 
in fact, that matter remains unresolved. Such dicta can have important consequences”) [hereinafter Fifth 
Circuit Holds That Undocumented Immigrants Do Not Have Second Amendment Rights]. 
250  Blair, supra note 109, at 185. 
251  Id. at 168. 
252  The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, supra note 2, at 1089. 
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in the Fifth Circuit’s decision.253  The court’s per curiam decision, which 
simply affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, was in part due to the 
minimal persuasive authority of Mr. Flores’ brief.  Although Mr. Flores’ 
brief utilized the substantial connection test, the brief did little to exploit the 
Fifth Circuit’s irrational approach of expanding the scope of the Heller 
decision.  The correct approach to challenging an incorrect interpretation of 
“the people” is to justify the use of the substantial connection test by 
emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent supports this position and 
Verdugo-Urquidez is still controlling authority.  This is accomplished by 
differentiating the specific question addressed in Heller and the Second 
Amendment question addressed in these cases.  This is where the appellant 
failed, which ultimately led to the Eighth Circuit’s per curiam decision.  
However, one portion of Flores’ brief warranted the court’s consideration.  
Specifically, Mr. Flores’ reiterated that it has been widely held that non-
U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have been afforded and are entitled to the 
protections of the Constitution.254  The fact that these individuals must 
oblige to our legal system follows that they ought to be entitled to the 
extensions of the United States Constitution.255  In fact, James Madison 
supported this position and declared, 
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the 
Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they 
actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection. 
Aliens are not more parties to the laws, than they are parties 
to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed, that as they 
owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, 
in return, to their protection and advantage.256 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit’s decision was misguided because it 
relied on the flawed decision of the Fifth Circuit.  However, not to discredit 
the court, Mr. Flores’ brief provided unpersuasive support for his Second 
Amendment claim and did little to challenge the preceding opinion of the 
Fifth Circuit.257  Strong and persuasive arguments emphasize that the Heller 
Court’s use of the word “citizen” and “law-abiding members” did not 
intentionally proscribe a constitutional test for the identity of “the people” 
 
253  See United States v. Flores, 663 F. 3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011). 
254  See generally supra note 123 (noting Supreme Court cases discussing constitutional 
protections extended to illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens). 
255  David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, 
25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 371 (2003). 
256  Id. 
257  See Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 4–10. 
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under the Second Amendment.258  The slicing and dicing of the Heller 
opinion is not the proper analysis to impose a restriction on the  
constitutional rights of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens. 
The Tenth Circuit was another court to uphold the Second Amendment 
ban on illegal alien’s possession of firearms.  The court did not specifically 
decide “the people” question of this Comment, but offered correct insight 
on how to interpret the Heller decision and the Second Amendment.259  The 
Tenth Circuit’s main proposition was that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits read 
too far in-depth into an unwritten holding of the Heller Court.260  This is the 
precise point as of why the analysis is flawed in the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits.  The Tenth Circuit addressed why Justice Scalia’s 
numerous references should not be taken to scrutinize “the people.”  
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Heller Court also referred to 
the First Amendment and citizens,261 which we surely can conclude that 
Justice Scalia did not establish that the First Amendment requires U.S. 
citizenship to speak for any purpose.262  The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ 
creative reading of Heller incorrectly leads to a narrower interpretation of 
“the people” and essentially overrules the foundational reading of the 
phrase established by the Supreme Court.263  Specifically, the Verdugo-
Urquidez decision laid the foundation that “people” is a term of broader 
content than “citizen.”264 
Courts must recognize that the Heller decision left an open door on 
other Second Amendment questions and must not partake in a slicing and 
dicing of the Heller opinion to introduce broader holdings with 
constitutional implications.  The Heller Court answered a narrow question 
of the individual right afforded under the Second Amendment; therefore, 
Justice Scalia’s noun references cannot be held as a deliberate attempt to 
settle the difficult question of defining “the people.”265  The Court has 
 
258  Blair, supra note 109, at 169 (writing, “[p]atriotically spirited as the word ‘citizen’ may be, it 
should not be read literally as a constitutional test”). 
259  See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012). 
260  Id. 
261  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (Scalia, J., opined “we do not 
read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, 
just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose”) 
(emphasis in original). 
262  Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168–69 (emphasizing, “Heller also spoke of the First 
Amendment rights of ‘citizens,’ though we know that that amendment extends in some degree to 
resident aliens, too”); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1945) (ruling that the First 
Amendment extends to resident aliens in some degree). 
263  Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 17. 
264  Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d at 1168. 
265  United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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explicitly cautioned against expansive reading of statements of decisions 
that address issues not before the Court.266  Specifically, the Court declared, 
“[our] job [is] to decide particular legal issues while assuming without 
deciding the validity of antecedent propositions . . . and such assumptions . . 
. are not binding in future cases that directly raise the questions.”267  
Although upholding the Second Amendment ban on other grounds, the 
Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that courts should not read into Heller an 
unwritten holding; therefore, the Court did not declare a citizenry only test 
for the protections of the Second Amendment. 
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the question and observed 
the decisions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.268  After undergoing a 
“distinct analysis” of Heller, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the numerous 
nouns of Justice Scalia’s opinion to declare that the Second Amendment 
requires a law-abiding, citizenry test to determine who is afforded the 
protections of the amendment.269  This approach of expanding the Heller 
decision is constitutionally incorrect and the various references to “citizens” 
and “law-abiding members” should not be taken as a literal interpretation of 
“the people.”  However, the Fourth Circuit introduced another aspect to this 
debate by highlighting the title undocumented individuals hold as 
“illegal.”270  The Fourth Circuit emphasized the title to reflect a historical 
approach that limits Second Amendment rights to individuals who are law-
abiding members of the community.271  The Fourth Circuit cites persuasive 
authority for its position that this right correlates with law-abiding 
individuals, but it fails to persuasively distinguish a law-abiding individual 
to someone who could be law-abiding, but merely entered the country 
illegally.272  Specifically, an individual can be a law-abiding, undocumented 
member of this country; however, the Fourth Circuit’s test of law-abiding is 
simply based on the title “illegal” rather than the relationship and 
connection with the community emphasized in its cited authority.273 
To clarify the Fourth Circuit’s incorrect analysis: the court first relied 
on an expanded interpretation of Heller, then focused on the Heller 
language of law-abiding citizens to interpret “the people” in the Second 
 
266  Id. 
267  Defendant-Appellant’s Brief and Required Short Appendix, supra note 13, at 17. 
268  See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F. 3d 974, 976–77 (4th Cir. 2012). 
269  Id. at 980. 
270  Id. at 979. 
271  Id. at 980. 
272  See id. at 979 (emphasizing that the Second Amendment is not tied to individuals declared as 
“unvirtuous citizens,” those who are not a law-abiding member of the community, but fails to 
acknowledge a law-abiding non-citizen in its analysis). 
273  Id. at 980. 
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Amendment, to ultimately conclude that undocumented individuals are non-
citizens and not law-abiding because they hold the title of “illegal.”  The 
Fourth Circuit’s approach is a complete misapplication of precedent and 
incorrectly applies the historical traditions this country was founded upon.  
First, the “law-abiding citizenry” test the court applied did not consider the 
historical relationship between this class of individuals and the community.  
Specifically, it must be clear that “the founders’ notion of citizenship was 
less rigid than ours, largely tied to the franchise, which itself was often 
based on little more than a period of residence and being a male with some 
capital.”274  Second, the position that undocumented individuals are not 
law-abiding simply based on a title is an improper categorization that is 
prejudicial and inaccurate.  Because whatever the class or title illegal aliens 
hold and belong to, these individuals are surely a part of “the people,” 
capable of being law-abiding, and must be afforded the protections of the 
Second Amendment.  Indeed, the text of the Constitution implies 
“protection[s] for [aliens] in the way it distinguishes citizens, persons, and 
the people.”275  This country has an established tradition of distinguishing 
between alien enemies from alien friends,276 and the Fourth Circuit’s focus 
on a classification title is improper with far-reaching implications on 
individuals who are already considered part of “the people” under our 
Constitution. 
Disregarding the other circuits holdings that illegal aliens and non-U.S. 
citizens are not part of “the people,” the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit 
to correctly interpret and extend the protections of the Second Amendment 
to this class of individuals.  The key component of the decision was the 
criticism of the other circuits’ unsound assumption that the terms “the 
people” and “citizen” must equate to the same meaning.  This per se 
exclusion of illegal aliens and non-U.S. citizens cannot be justified by 
Supreme Court precedent and the historical traditions of this country.  Also, 
the Seventh Circuit did not engage in an overly broad interpretation of 
Heller and rebuked the notion of a citizenry only Second Amendment right.  
The primary flaw in each of these earlier circuits is the fact that each court 
selected indistinct parts of the Heller opinion to justify their positions.  
When in fact, looking at the Heller opinion as a whole, other language of 
the decision actually supports the opposite result.  Specifically, Heller 
recognized the similarities of the phrase “the people” found in the Second 
 
274  United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 2 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 839–43 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007)). 
275  Moore, supra note 12, at 810. 
276  Id.; see also United States v. Chase, 281 F. 2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1960) (emphasizing, “[T]he 
Constitution is for the despicable as well as for the admirable”). 
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Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, which suggests that the 
identical phrasing must be interpreted the same throughout.277  Indeed, 
nothing suggests that our framers intended this entitlement to be a citizen 
only pre-existing right. 
The Meza-Rodriguez court also correctly respected the fact that the 
term “citizen” appears in other distinct parts of the Constitution compared 
to “the people” within the Bill of Rights.  Therefore, these terms must not 
be treated as synonymous when each term has been distinctly used in 
different clauses of the Constitution.278  The distinct uses of the terms 
“citizens” and “non-citizens” is “constitutionally important in no less than 
[eleven] instances in a political document noted for its brevity.”279  These 
distinct uses suggest that the extension of the Bill of Rights was to reach 
further than the ordinary citizen.  Specifically, the Bill of Rights makes no 
mention of “citizen” and focuses on the broader terms of “people” and 
“persons.”280 The framers’ conscious avoidance to not encompass the term 
“citizen” in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted that the drafters conveyed 
a purpose to extend these rights to a broader class of individuals.281 
Furthermore, there is wide-spread criticism related to the case-by-case 
analysis courts may undergo to apply the substantial connections test; 
however, this criticism remains unanswered as the Supreme Court has only 
once attempted to define “the people” within the Bill of Rights.  Justice 
Brennan, dissenting in Verdugo-Urquidez, declared that the “precise 
contours” of the test remain unclear and criticized the interchangeable 
references of “sufficient connections,” “substantial connections,” and 
“accepting societal obligations” when applying these tests to make a 
determination of whether an illegal alien or a non-U.S. citizen is part of “the 
people.”282  Although courts will continue to be confronted with these 
difficult questions, they must recognize that the Supreme Court has 
established precedent, one that was textually incorporated in Heller, to 
interpret the identical phrasing of “the people” within the First, Second, and 
Fourth Amendments the same way.  Courts must respect the fact that 
Verdugo-Urquidez addressed the specific question of defining “the people” 
and observed the principles of fundamental fairness.  Specifically, the Bill 
 
277  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015). 
278  See Cole, supra note 255, at 368 (writing, “[b]ecause the Constitution expressly limits to 
citizens only the rights to vote and to run for federal elective office, equality between non-nationals and 
citizens would appear to be the constitutional rule”). 
279  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
280  Moore, supra note 12, at 806. 
281  Id. 
282  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 282–83 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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of Rights protections extend beyond the citizenry.283  As Second 
Amendment jurisprudence continues to develop, courts should limit their 
interpretation of Heller and focus on the undisturbed constitutional 
interpretation of “the people.” 
Although the Seventh Circuit decision was in direct conflict with other 
circuits, the application of the substantial connection test to the Second 
Amendment is the only appropriate interpretation of how to define “the 
people.”  Supreme Court precedent and scholars have made it clear that the 
Heller decision was the first in-depth consideration of the Second 
Amendment and therefore, a broad interpretation should not be basis for a 
full-fledged prohibition on all members of a class.  Ultimately, relying on 
Justice Scalia’s amorphous references to “citizens” or “law abiding 
members” regarding “the people” is not a sufficient basis to restrict 
constitutional rights of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens.284  Courts 
addressing a Second Amendment challenge must look to the Heller 
decision as a whole, and not one phrase or word at a time.  The Meza-
Rodriguez court correctly distinguished the purported individual right issue 
answered in Heller versus the specific question of defining “the people” 
within the Second Amendment.  With little precedent in clearly defining 
“the people,” courts must look to Verdugo-Urquidez and apply the 
substantial connections test as opposed to a complete prohibition based on 
dicta and unspecified fear and prejudice of non-U.S. citizens and illegal 




Heller and McDonald are landmark decisions that exacerbated 
confusion of gun laws throughout the United States.285  But it is clear what 
these cases did not do, they did not strip away the Second Amendment 
protections of non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens.286  In fact, the Seventh 
Circuit correctly held that the term “the people” has the same meaning 
throughout the Bill of Rights287 and thus, non-U.S. citizens and illegal 
aliens are afforded the protections when the Verdugo-Urquidez substantial 
connections test is satisfied.  Ultimately, the Verdugo-Urquidez is the 
primary standard to determine who is among “the people” protected by the 
 
283  Id. at 282. 
284  See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2012). 
285  Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Guns and Membership in the American Polity, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 619, 622 (2012). 
286  Blair, supra note 109, at 190. 
287  See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F. 3d at 664. 
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Bill of Rights.288  Therefore, the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
must not be stripped away based on erroneous interpretations of Heller 
dicta.289 The opposing circuits’ decisions require considerable revision 
because precedent and historical traditions clearly exemplify that gun 
ownership is not connected to citizenship status.290 
With the tragic events and the related gun debate, Congress may 
choose to enact reasonable restrictions upon these individuals.  However, 
the restrictions must undergo a strict analysis of the right at issue and the 
“prohibitions which that right has long accommodated.”291  The Second 
Amendment’s individual right discussion raises tensions, and even 
contradictions, but non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have developed 
deeply ingrained ties and are entitled to constitutional protections.292  These 
cases are bigger than the mere possession of a gun, they are about 
fundamental fairness for those who are protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Depriving a class of individuals of a fundamental right, based on an 
overly broad extension of dicta, warrants considerable reconsideration 
because non-U.S. Citizens and illegal aliens “are protected by the nation’s 
core foundational and governing document.”293  These individuals must be 
able to utilize their right to bear arms consistent with the original political 
understanding of the Second Amendment, to protect and maintain the 
integrity of this nation.294  Beginning with the founding of this country, 
non-U.S. citizens and illegal aliens have developed and maintained 
substantial connections with this country, but often fail to obtain the title of 
“legal” or “citizen.”  The title of “citizen” is the most cherished and 
proudest accomplishment of millions of immigrants who enter this country.  
However, the title of U.S. citizen should not be the centerpiece for their 
inclusion to the Second Amendment. 
The specific identity of “the people” within the Second Amendment 
has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court; however, with reliance on 
decisions of the Court, the constitutional phrase “the people” does not only 
extend to citizens, but history and precedent clearly incorporates illegal 
aliens and non-U.S. citizens as part of “the people” of this country.295  This 
 
288  Blair, supra note 109, at 190. 
289  Id. 
290  Gulasekaram, supra note 7, at 1579. 
291  Fifth Circuit Holds That Undocumented Immigrants Do Not Have Second Amendment 
Rights, supra note 249, at 840. 
292  Moore, supra note 12, at 876. 
293  Id. 
294  Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the 
Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 911 (2007) [hereinafter Aliens with Guns]. 
295  Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 712 
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“cycle of citizen paranoia and alien fear” will continue to plague these 
unauthorized individuals and infringes on their essential right to protect 
themselves and family.296  We must accept that our country has always and 
will continue to afford the people within our borders the protections of the 
United States Constitution. 
 
 
(2003) (writing, “History strongly suggests that the use of the word “people” . . . was not in any way 
intended to exclude noncitizens from the rights safeguarded therein”). 
296  Aliens with Guns, supra note 294, at 919. 
